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Batchelor: Extent of the Government's Informer Privilege in Federal and Flor

NOTES
EXTENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INFORMER PRIVILEGE IN
FEDERAL AND FLORIDA CRIMINAL CASES
The testimonial informer privilege allows the government to withhold
from disclosure the identity of persons furnishing information about criminal
activity to law enforcement officials. This privilege is based on the sound
public policy of better law enforcement and seeks to achieve this goal by
encouraging the individual to cooperate with police authorities by communicating his knowledge of illegal activity. The privilege, however, is not
absolute. This note will examine the extent of exceptions to the informer
privilege in the federal and Florida courts.
NATURE

OF THE

PRIVILEGE

A cursory look at the history of the informer privilege may be helpful
in understanding its scope.' It was first enunciated in 1790 by Lord Kenyon
when he held that "the defendant's counsel have no right nor shall they be
permitted to inquire the name of the person who gave the information of
the smuggled goods."2 Early American courts held that the informer's identity
could be disclosed only at the discretion of the government, which they assumed would act in the best interest of the public. 3 However, this position
had a serious defect in that a government decision to disclose might often
adversely affect its prosecution of the accused. On the other hand, without
the informer's identity it could be impossible to prepare an adequate defense.
The English courts resolved this conflict by requiring the government to disclose the informer's identity when, in the trial judge's opinion, it was necessary to show the innocence of the defendant. 4 American courts, responding
to this situation, followed the lead of the English, compelling disclosure
"when it would provide useful evidence to vindicate the innocence of the
accused, or lessen the risk of false testimony, or was essential to the disposition
of the case." 5 In Scher v. United States6 the United States Supreme Court
recognized an exception when disclosure was essential to the defense.
Courts have long imposed a duty on the individual citizen to communicate to those charged with enforcing a particular law any information he
might have relative to a violation of that law.7 By itself, this duty has been
1. See Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872) detailed discussion of historical
case development).
2. Rex v. Akers, 170 Eng. Rep. 850 (1790).
3. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872).
4. Marks v. Beyfus, 25 Q.B.D. 494 (1890).
5. Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932).
6. 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
7. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872).
[218]
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insufficient, and many individuals would continue to remain silent were their
identity unprotected. s Hence, the informer privilege has been developed to
encourage people to perform their duty.9 As a practical matter, the privilege
protects the informer and his family from physical harm, precludes any
adverse social reactions, and avoids the risk of actions for defamation or
malicious prosecution. 10 The government also benefits from nondisclosure
since police often rely on a group of informers to furnish them with knowledge of illegal activity. Once the identity of one of this class of informers
is made known, his utility is destroyed, and others are discouraged from
making similar disclosures.,"
Technically, the informer privilege belongs to the government -not to
the informer. 2 The government, consequently, may waive the privilege and
voluntarily disclose the identity of its informant."3 At least one writer has
argued that "once the informer takes it upon himself to step out of the role
of simply transmitting information to a law enforcement officer, he elects to
14
give up the right to anonymity with which the privilege clothes him."
Implicit in this position is the assumption that the informer has a right that
he may waive,15 a notion contrary to the conclusion that the privilege belongs
to the government and not the informer.: It would be more consistent to
conclude that once the informer goes beyond simply informing,17 he places
himself in a situation where it is possible that an exception will be granted to
the government's privilege.
If the defense wishes to secure the identity of a confidential informer,
it must seek to have the court grant an exception to the privilege. The initial
step is a demand on the prosecution for the identity of the informer. Such a
move is necessary since the government is under no duty to volunteer such
information. 8 If this demand is not made at or before trial the defendant
is deemed to have waived any exception to the privilege to which he might
otherwise have been entitled.' 9 Some authority exists for the proposition
Gutterman, The Informer Privilege,58 J. CRiM. L. C. & P. S. 32 (1967).
9. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884).
10. Id.; Harrington v. State, 110 So. 2d 495 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959); 8 J. WMoRE,
EvmEN E §2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
11. Harrington v. State, 110 So. 2d 495 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959); J. WiGMom supra note
9; Gutterman, supra note 8.
12. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53,59 (1957).
13. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp.
8.

731 (S.D. Cal. 1952).

k

14. Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. Rv.
166, 180 n.54 (1959).
15. Note, The Privilege of Withholding the Identity of an Informer, 28 U. Prrr. L. REv.
477 (1968). The reason for an exception being granted in this situation is developed
later in the text.
16. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
17. For example, the informer may be a participant in the crime (see text at infra
notes 30, 31), may be a party to an incriminating conversation with the defendant, or may

be a contact between the police and the defendant.
18. Firo v. United States, 340 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Conforti, 200
F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952).
19. Firo v. United States, 340 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1965).
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that upon making the demand the defendant has the burden of showing that
nondisclosure will prejudice his defense.20 The only Florida decision directly
considering this issue required the defendant to demonstrate that the informer
21
would have been a material witness on the issue of guilt.
Once the court has required disclosure, the duty of the government is
unclear. It is well established that the informer must be named or prosecution dropped. 22 Thus, the government can still protect the identity of its
informant by dismissing the charges. If the government elects to name the
informant, generally the state's failure to produce him does not violate the
rights of the accused.3 However, at least one court has suggested that there
"may be cases where the government would be under a duty to produce the
informer if it is able to do so."24 At the very least it appears that the government must supply sufficient information, if available, to enable the defendant
to locate the informer. 25 Some courts require more. The Eighth Circuit held
that the prosecution should make all reasonable efforts to find the informer.2 6
The Seventh Circuit placed the burden on the trial court to determine
whether the government had the information necessary to locate the informer. 27 The courts themselves have raised the question whether the government can avoid disclosure by refusing to learn the names and addresses
of its informers.68 The question has remained unanswered, but working from
the premise that exceptions to the privilege are granted on a notion of fairness, it seems unlikely that the government would be permitted to employ
this tactic successfully.
Essentially, exceptions to the informer privilege are granted: when the
informer's identity may be relevant to the issue of guilt or when it may relate
to the establishment of probable cause for testing the legality of arrest or
2 9

search and seizure.

EXTENT OF THE PRIVILEGE

RELATIVE TO THE

ISSUE OF GUILT

Federal Courts
In Scher v. United States, 30 the United States Supreme Court formally
20. Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 839
(1947).
21. State v. Hardy, 114 So. 2d 344 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
22. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53
(1957).
23. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Eberhart v. United States, 262 F.2d 421 (9th
Cir. 1958).
24. United States v. Roviaro, 327 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir. 1964).
25. United States v. D'Angiolillo, 340 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 955
(1965).
26. White v. United States, 330 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855
(1964).
27. United States v. Collier, 313 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 844
(1963).
28. United States v. Pruitt, 331 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 884
(1964).
29. Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
30. 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
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recognized that an exception to the informer privilege should be granted
when knowledge of the informer's identity is essential to the defense of the
accused. However, the decision did not establish guidelines for determining
when an informer's identity was essential. Thus, lower federal courts
developed what is usually called the "participation test." As long as the
informer did nothing more than figuratively point his finger at the accused,
the Government was not required to disclose his identity. But, once the
informer became a participant in the transaction for which charges were
brought, his identity became material to the defense.81
The participation test may insure more uniform application of exceptions
to the informer privilege, but some courts have concluded it does not always
produce the most satisfactory result. In an early English case, Regina v.
Richardson, 2 the defendant was charged with poisoning his employer. In
making the arrest the police had relied on confidential information that a
container of poison was hidden in his quarters. The court required disclosure on the grounds that, although not a participant, the informer might
provide assistance in explaining the location of the container. The California
supreme court has held that "disclosure is not limited to the informer who
participates in the crime alleged."33 The testimony of an "eyewitnessnonparticipant" informer might "vindicate the innocence of the accused or
lessen the risk of false testimony"34 in which case his identity would be
relevant to the defense.
The question of what standards should be used to determine availability
of an exception to the informer privilege was before the United States Supreme Court in Roviaro v. United States.35 There, petitioner was convicted of
selling heroin and of transporting narcotics. The immediate issue was whether
the trial court had committed prejudicial error by not requiring disclosure
of the confidential informer's identity. The informer had driven the defendant
to the spot where the narcotics were hidden, and he had received possession
of them from the defendant. The Government did not defend nondisclosure
with respect to the first count, admitting that the informer was a participant
in the sale. But it sought to sustain the conviction on the second count by
arguing that the informer's identity had no real bearing on the charge of
transporting the narcotics. The Court reversed the convictions, holding:86
[N]o fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem
calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of
information against the individual's right to prepare his defense.
Whether the proper balance allows for nondisclosure depends on the
particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the
crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the
informer's testimony and other relevant factors.
31. Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Conforti,
200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952); Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947).
32. 176 Eng. Rep. 318 (1863).
33. People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 808, 330 P.2d 33, 36 (1958).
34. Id.

35. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
36. Id. at 62.
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Having set out these criteria, the Court systematically applied them to the
facts. Under the charge of transporting narcotics, the defendant had the
burden of explaining his alleged possession of the heroin. Without access to
any material witness, this burden might have become unduly heavy. The
informer's testimony could possibly have disclosed entrapment or thrown
doubt on the identity of petitioner or of the package. The handicap worked
by nondisclosure was emphasized by the prosecution's use of a policeman
who testified to a conversion he overheard between the defendant and the
informant: the informer was the only witness who could contradict or corroborate the testimony of the policeman. For these reasons the Court decided
that prejudicial error had been committed.
The lower federal courts now had an authoritative guide to aid them in
granting exceptions to the informer privilege. The tendency of some courts
has been to limit the Roviaro holding. Several decisions have restricted its
application to cases in which the defense of entrapment is involved 3 7 and
even in this instance disclosure may not be mandatory.38 Other courts have
stated their approval of Roviaro, but emphasized the informant's participation in the act.3 9 In Miller v. United States40 the court denied disclosure
because the informer was not one who was an "active participant in the crime
nor ... one whose presence gave the 'atmosphere of confidence' during critical
moments." 4 1 However, the court went on to state that the informer's physical

presence at the scene of the alleged crime is not always necessary for granting
an exception to the privilege. Confronted with the tendency of lower courts
to continue to rely on a participation test, the Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed its holding that there is to be no absolute rule regarding disclosure
of an informer's identity.

42

In addition to those cases in which disclosure is material to the defense,
there are two other situations in which the government will not be allowed
to exercise its privilege. If the contents of a communication between the
authorities and an informer do not tend to reveal the identity of the informer,
then the communication is not privileged. 43 The other exception arises if
the identity of the informer is discovered by the defendant, or if for some
other reason, such as the death of the informer, the privilege would no
longer serve its purpose.

44

There is, however, a split of authority whether it is prejudicial error
to refuse disclosure when the defendant has discovered the identity of the
37. United States v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1964); Mosco v. United States,
301 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 842 (1962).
38. United States v. Fredia, 319 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1963).
39. United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
933 (1964); Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928
(1960); Pegram v. United States 267 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1959); Gilmore v. United States, 256
F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958).
40. 273 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960).
41. Id. at 281.
42. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
43. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
44.

Id.
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informant. Three circuit courts of appeal hold that such refusal is harmless
error. 45 The government in Roviaro argued against reversal, contending
that the defendant knew the identity of the informer and was thus not prejudiced by nondisclosure. Both the majority and the dissent would accept this
reasoning. The majority, however, maintained that the record did not
support the conclusion that the defendant knew the informer's identity. Mr.
Justice Clark's dissent is based on his inference to the contrary. He would
thus hold the nondisclosure to be harmless error and affirm the conviction.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the opposite approach, holding
that improper refusal to order disclosure is prejudicial error because it is
impossible to determine the extent of prejudice caused by the denial.46
In summary, relative to the issue of guilt, there exists in the federal courts
three limitations on the informer privilege:
(1) a communication between officers and an informer is not privileged if it does not tend to indicate the identity of the informer;
(2) once the identity has been discovered by one who would have
cause to resent the communication, the privilege no longer applies;
(3) where the identity of the informer is relevant and helpful to the
defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of cause the
privilege must give way.
The first two limitations are based on the underlying purpose of the privilege:
when no longer necessary to preserve the flow of information to law enforcement agencies, the privilege may not be invoked. These two limitations
present few problems in their application. The third is based on a fundamental notion of fairness and has caused courts some difficulty. The test of the
relevancy of an informer's identity to the defense consists of balancing the
conflicting interests on a case-by-case approach, taking into consideration the
changes, possible defenses, potential significance of the informer's testimony
and any other relevant factors. While some courts have been reluctant to
inquire into all these aspects, careful scrutiny appears to be the most equitable
solution to the conflict. By establishing no fixed rule the court remains
responsive to the needs of society and the individual in each different factual
context and can best protect the opposing interests involved.
Florida Courts
The Florida courts, although slower in recognizing exceptions to the
informer privilege, have followed a line similar to that of the federal courts.
As late as 1958, the Florida supreme court held that a conviction "should
not be reversed because lurking in the background was some informer whom
the defendant should have been permitted to examine. 47 Exceptions to the
45. Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846
(1960); United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952); Sorrentino v. United States,

163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947).
46. Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955) (defendants testified they
were of the opinion that they knew the informer's identity).

47. Ferrara v. State, 101 So. 2d 797, 799 (Fla. 1958).
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privilege have been developed by lower Florida appellate courts. In Harrington v. State,48 after a strong policy statement in favor of the privilege, the
court held that disclosure could be required when material to the issue, to
secure useful testimony, or to avoid the risk of false testimony. Hardy v.
State49 subsequently indicated that participation was the criterion for determining materiality.-O The court distinguished Roviaro, noting that in Hardy
the informer took no part in the transaction that resulted in criminal
charges against the defendant. On this ground it denied the request for
disclosure.
Spataro v. State51 presented the Second District Court of Appeal with a
factual situation in which the police, acting on information supplied by a
confidential informer, had arrested the defendant and found narcotics hidden
in his bedroom. He was prosecuted for possession of the drugs. The state's key
witness was a woman who shared the room with the defendant and had free
access to it. The court, citing Roviaro, considered the various factors set forth
therein and required the state to expose its informer. Hardy v. State5 2 was
distinguished on the grounds that the defendant there had exclusive control
of access to the house. The informer's testimony was relevant in Spataro
because her relationship with the accused and her access to the premises cast
doubt on her credibility. In the court's opinion, the basic issue was a balancing of interests and it concluded "as in most cases which are largely a matter
of degrees there will be disagreement among reasonable men in particular
cases. When such is the case the issue must be resolved in favor of the
53
individual."
The lack of a recent decision by the Florida supreme court and the
apparent disagreement between the districts make it difficult to determine
under what circumstances exceptions to the informer privilege will be granted.
However, a recent Florida supreme court decision, involving the informer
privilege in a probable cause context, indicates that the court supports the
second district's position in Spataro v. State.54 If that decision indicates the
course of future decisions, Florida courts will have the same flexibility now
available to federal courts seeking to protect both the interest of the state
in law enforcement and the right of the individual to prepare his defense.
EXTENT OF THE PRIVILEGE IN ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
ARREST OR SEARCH

Federal Courts
"If what is asked is essential to the proper disposition of the case, disclosure will be compelled."5 With this rationale the defense may seek an
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

110 So. 2d 495 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Hardy v. State, 114 So. 2d 344 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Cf. text at supra notes 30,32.
179 So. 2d 873 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1965).
114 So. 2d 344 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873, 881 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
Treverrow v. State, 194 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1967).
Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 3
1968]

GOVERNMENT'S INFORMER PRIVILEGE

exception to the informer privilege in order to test the legality of an arrest
or search and seizure. In the early case of United States v. Blich,56 a federal
agent, acting solely on an informer's tip, searched the defendant's car without
a warrant and found illegal liquor. The court required disclosure of the
informer's identity so that the judge could determine the reliability of the
information received and the agent's justification for believing the informer.
In short, the state had to reveal its informer to establish probable cause for
57
the search.
The United States Supreme Court distinguished Blitch when faced with
similar facts. 58 Federal authorities were informed of the accused's bootlegging
operation, but before making the arrest the officers observed the defendant
loading heavy packages into his car. The Court deemed this fact significant
and denied the request for disclosure. The officers acted on what they had
seen and not on what they had been told. The opinion ignores the fact that
the informer's tip aroused the suspicions of the police. Further, it is questionable whether the loading of heavy packages is enough, by itself, to establish probable cause. This act became significant only when coupled with the
knowledge gained from the informer. Consequently, the confidential information was vital to a determination of the legality of the arrest and disclosure
should have been required. 59
Roviaro v. United States0 did not present the United States Supreme
Court with a probable cause issue, but the opinion states that "where disclosure of an informer's identity . . . is essential to a fair determination of
the cause the privilege must give way."', Thus, the Court indicated its
willingness to expand this exception to the probable cause area. One of the
criteria established in Roviaro, the "possible significance of the informer's
testimony," 62 has received particular emphasis in some probable cause cases. 3
These decisions have been based on whether there was ample evidence, aside
from the informer's information, to establish probable cause. If there was,
disclosure was not required.
In 1959 the United States Supreme Court developed another theory to
justify nondisclosure of the identity of an informer when testing the legality
of an arrest or search and seizure. If the informer has established a reputation
of reliability, and his information is substantially corroborated before the
defendant's arrest, there is probable cause despite the fact that the officer's
56. 45 F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930).
57. But see United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945) (a government
official could not be compelled to reveal the identity of an informer unless there was a

showing upon trial that it was necessary in order to establish the prisoner's innocence).
This case received limited support in Pegram v. United States, 267 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1959).
58. Scher v. United States, 505 U.S. 251 (1938).
59.

Gutterman, supra note 8, at 41.

60. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
61. Id. at 60.
62. Id. at 61.
63. United States v. Elgisser, 334 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 US. 879
(1964); United States v. Robinson, 325 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1963); Cochran v. United States,
291 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 1961).
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independent observations are inadequate to establish it.64 A year later the
Court held that observations of one other than the affiant could be set
out in a search warrant, as long as there was a strong basis for believing the
hearsay presented. 65 When confronted with analogous fact situations, defense
attorneys argued that they could not question the reliability of the informer
unless they could learn his identity. However, if every defendant were permitted to discover the identity of his informer in order to test his reliability,
practically there would be no informer privilege. 66
In Augilar v. Texas67 the Supreme Court was again faced with the task
of balancing the conflicting interests of the state and the individual.
8
The Court held:6
[A]lthough an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need
not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant . . . the

magistrate must be informed of some underlying circumstances from
which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need
not be disclosed, was "credible" or his information "reliable."
In effect, the Court is still requiring probable cause but is allowing it to
be established indirectly. The interest of the state in shielding informers
is protected by allowing the officer to testify as to the knowledge of the
informer. At the same time, the defendant's interest is protected by placing
on the state the burden of establishing that the informer's conclusions are
sound and his word reliable.
In McCray v. Illinois,69 the latest case on this issue decided by the United
States Supreme Court, the two arresting officers testified that they had known
the informer approximately one year during which he had provided accurate
information about narcotics activity fifteen or sixteen times resulting in
numerous arrests and convictions. They stated further that the informer
told them he had seen the defendant selling narcotics to various addicts in
the vicinity of the arrest. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that probable
cause existed. Because each of the officers described with specificity "what
the informer actually said, and why the officer thought the information was
credible," 70 the state was justified in withholding the identity of it's informer.
The dissent based its position on the fact that the arrest was made without a
warrant. It argued that the judicial safeguards were bypassed and the police,
not the court, determined the reliability of the informer. Absent a warrant,
the informer should be produced and cross-examined. To do otherwise,
warned the minority, is to encourage arrest and searches without warrants
and weaken the fourth amendment's protection.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Id. at 114.
McCray v.Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
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From McCray v. Illinois71 it appears that all nine justices are willing to
accept the procedure set out in Augilar if it is followed in obtaining a warrant.
The minority would allow the state to keep secret the identity of its informers,
as long as it permits the courts to determine the credibility of the informer,
and the justification of reliance on his communication prior to any action by
the police. This caution seems founded on the possibility that the arresting
officer might misrepresent his relationship with the informer, exaggerate his
knowledge of the informer's reliability, or distort the information allegedly
obtained from the informer in seeking to sustain his own actions. 72 There
is little risk of such behavior prior to arrest because the officer is not placed
in a position of defending his actions. The dissent indicates that there may
be emergency situations in which action taken without a warrant should not
require disclosure, but as a general rule disclosure should be required when a
warrant is not obtained. This restricted approach seems sounder than the
position of the majority. It gives the state an opportunity to protect its
interests while minimizing the chance of infringement on the rights of the
individual.
The petitioner in McCray also raised a constitutional argument based on
his sixth amendment right of confrontation and cross-examination73 He
contended that the state violated these rights by not producing the informer
to appear as a witness. The Court held this to be "absolutely devoid of
merit." 74 The argument that defendant was denied his right to cross:.examine
the arresting officers by virtue of their refusal to reveal the identity of the
informer was also rejected. The Court reasoned that from the defendant's
proposition it would follow that "no witness on cross-examination could constitutionally assert a testimonial privilege," including that against compulsory
75
self-incrimination.
Florida Courts
There exists in Florida the practice of permitting confidential informants
to sign affidavits with fictitious names. A split of authority has developed
whether the defendant can learn the true identity of such an affiant. The
Second District Court of Appeal has held that the state is not required to
produce such a witness. 76 The Third District Court of Appeal took the
opposite position that when a "confidential informant" actually executes the
affidavit, disclosure is required77 However, in a subsequent case it limited
this holding to situations where a false name was used to sign the affidavit.78
If a police officer signs the affidavit based on what the informant has told
him, disclosure is not required. The third district was concerned that should
71. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1960).
73. 386 U.S. 300, 312 (1967).

74. Id. at 313; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 n.2 (1967).
75.
76.
77.
78.

386 U.S. 300, 314 (1967).
Byers v. State, 109 So. 2d 382 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d 729 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1963).
City of Miami v. Jones, 165 So. 2d 775 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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the affidavit signed with a fictitious name prove to be false, no one could be
held responsible for perjury. The court's decision appears to be a step
backwards. Previously the informer came before a judicial officer and was
available for thorough examination. Now the police officer is the sole arbiter
of the informant's credibility and the only one to appear before the courtRecently in Treverrow v. State ° an officer stated in the affidavit that a
"reliable confidential informer" had told him that he saw fermented mash
on the described premises. The Florida supreme court held that disclosure
was not required because the agent had affirmed, under oath, that the informer was one whom he considered reliable and that the information consisted of a direct observation by the informer. This opinion apparently leans
toward the holding in Aguilar v. Texas,81 but the Florida court is unwilling to
limit the privilege to the extent in that case. Florida will require the state
to show the informer's basis for his information and thus permit the court
to decide if it can justifiably be relied upon. However, the decision as to the
credibility of the informer remains in the hands of the police, leaving room
for the abuses pointed out by the dissent in McCray.
CONCLUSION

The privilege protecting the informer's identity is based on this premise
that his information is necessary for controlling crime. To do away with
this privilege altogether would unduly hamper police in effective law enforcement, especially in such areas as narcotics and illegal liquor. Thus, the
privilege is necessary, but because of its close relationship with the defense
of the accused, its application should be strictly regulated by the courts. Such
close supervision has been characteristic of recent decisions on the subject,
which have done much to eliminate previously existing inequities.
The state has been given this privilege to assist it in carrying out its
function of law enforcement. Therefore, the burden should be on the state
to establish, in a given situation, that the privilege ought to be invoked.
Exceptions are granted on a notion of fairness to the defendant. Placing the
burden on the prosecution would make it incumbent on the government to
demonstrate that the accused would not be prejudiced by nondisclosure of
the informer's identity. In a close case, with the burden on the state, the
court will be more likely to resolve judicial doubt in favor of the defendant
on the basis that the state has failed to meet its burden of proof. Thus,
unfairness to the defense caused by the privilege would be reduced to a
minimum. Where the burden of showing prejudice is on the defendant, as
it has been in the past, the close question is decided in favor of the state,
thereby exposing the defendant to possible prejudice. In view of the modern
tendency to protect the rights of the individual, this shift in the burden of
establishing application of the informer privilege would seem a desirable step.
DOUGLAS BATCHELOR

79. Gutterman, supra note 8.
80. 194 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1967).
81. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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